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INTRODUCTION

Contemporary free speech law is typically misfocused. This misfocus serves neither the purposes underlying the institution of free
speech nor any broader social rights and interests in conflict with freedom of speech. As a general matter, the adjudication of free speech
claims should properly focus, centrally, on the intent of the regulating
government. More specifically, courts should focus crucially on
whether the government has, in enacting or enforcing its speech regulation, intended to suppress or disadvantage a presumed or actual idea
or its expression. This sharpened focus would allow the courts to
responsibly address a surprisingly broad range of free speech cases
with a substantially diminished need for attention to a number of artificial, if not unnecessary, judicial doctrines that have gradually been
incorporated into the free speech case law.
This Article first briefly establishes the nature, and the typical costs,
of official inhibition of speech in general.1 The Article then more exhttps://doi.org/10.37419/LR.V9.I2.3
* Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney
School of Law.
1. See infra Part II. While our approach seeks to properly accommodate free
speech values as well as other rights and interests, our approach to free speech law is
neither distinctively individual-rights focused nor distinctively focused on policy ef-
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tensively examines a range of the contemporary case law,2 with attention, successively, to the recent student speech case of Mahanoy Area
School District v. B.L.;3 to cases involving various sorts of borderline
and non-traditional forms of speech; and then to questions of contentbased and content-neutral regulations of commercial and non-commercial speech, as raised by the case of Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona4 and the later case law.5 The Article then addresses the problem
of properly inferring, or otherwise ascertaining, any meaningful government intent to suppress or disadvantage a particular idea.6 A brief
conclusion then follows.7
Throughout, it will be useful to remember that in all sorts of free
speech cases, the relevant government’s intentions are likely to have
been multiple; partly conflicting; or perhaps mutually linked, if not
inseparable. Commonly, a government that is restricting speech may
have an intent to suppress or disadvantage an idea where that intent is
somehow linked to a more benign intent to discourage some perceived public harm that is thought by the government to result from
the speech in question.8 On our approach, if there is any causally significant government intent to suppress or disadvantage an idea, the
speech restriction generally must fail. The result should follow even if
the same restriction could have been adopted with no such invidious
intent, and for worthy public purposes.9
Thankfully, not all substantial restrictions on speech involve any intent to suppress an idea. Thus some restrictions on, for example, politfects or consequentialist. See generally Erica Goldberg, Free Speech Consequentialism,
116 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 687 (2018). A doctrinal focus on the consequences, or effects, of speech regulations is the currently dominant approach. See Elena Kagan,
Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 413–14 (1996). As we shall see throughout, the
adverse consequences of a regulation on speakers and their ideas are often the best
evidence of government intent. A speech-restrictive intent may be present from the
beginning or may arise after the policy is implemented as evidenced in some such
cases by an otherwise unexplained refusal to modify the policy in question.
2. See infra Part III.
3. See infra Section III.B.
4. See infra Section III.D.
5. See infra Section III.E. We note in particular that some content-based restrictions on speech involve no intent to suppress the relevant idea, while some contentneutral restrictions do indeed bespeak such an intent.
6. See infra Part IV. Unlike that of the approach adopted below, then-Professor
Elena Kagan’s emphasis focused on the motive-discovering potential of distinctions
such as content-based, content-neutral, and subject-matter-based restrictions; low versus high value speech; and incidental versus targeted restrictions on speech. See Kagan, supra note 1, at 414–15.
7. See infra Part V.
8. See infra Section III.B.
9. This approach leaves open the possibility of later enacting the same or similar
speech restriction but without an intent to suppress or disadvantage any relevant idea.
See Kagan, supra note 1, at 431–32, 439 (showing one possible sense of causal significance in this context); see also Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274, 286–87 (1977).
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ical speech, along with many instances of restrictions on libelous
speech; fraudulent speech; politically favored speech that is irrelevant
to the forum; noisy or distracting speech; perjury; or speech that
would impair national security10 can be enacted without any causally
significant hostility to any idea that the speaker wishes to express. But
again, regardless of the nature of the speech in question, if the restricting government harbors any causally relevant intention to suppress or
disadvantage the idea in question, the speech restriction should generally be struck down. The social costs of such a judicial response to
such a speech regulatory intent need not be substantial. Such a focus
would, on the other hand, helpfully allow for reduced judicial attention to, if not a complete bypass of, a number of currently ubiquitous
and largely distracting free speech tests and categories.11
II.

SPEECH INHIBITION

IN

GENERAL & ITS COSTS

The Supreme Court’s broad distrust of governmental inhibition of
private actor speech is clear. Consider, merely for example, this language, repeated by the Court on several important occasions:
The constitutional right of free expression is . . . intended to remove
governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting
the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands
of each of us . . . in the belief that no other approach would comport
with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our
political system rests.12

In part, the Court’s concern is for the availability of information.13
Thus “the State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First
Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge.”14
More fundamentally, the Court has recognized that official inhibition of speech inescapably conflicts with the underlying speech-pro10. For the sake of clarity, consider the case of an idea that the restricting government actually endorses and approves of, but which might complicate relations with, or
embarrass, a foreign government, or that is expressed in the wrong public forum. See
also Kagan, supra note 1, at 433–35.
11. Among the inevitable complications, consider a well-intended speech regulation that is nevertheless unnecessarily broad and innocently lacking in its tailoring to
the government’s benign purpose. We do not herein address entirely innocent and
responsibly intended, and thus commonly less significant, speech regulations.
12. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (quoting Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448–49 (1991)); see
also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (discussing the censorship of “offensive or disagreeable” ideas on just that basis).
13. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 116.
14. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
866 (1982) (plurality opinion) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482
(1965)).
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tection values of discovering and disseminating important truths;15 of
deliberative democracy as distinct from arbitrary government;16 and
the development, realization, and flourishing of personal faculties and
capabilities.17 And each of these underlying speech values—roughly,
the optimal pursuit of truth;18 meaningful representative democratic
government;19 and the promotion of autonomous self-realization20—
has been recognized by leading scholars.21
It is possible for a government to suppress or disadvantage the private-party expression of disfavored ideas, while itself publicizing its
own formulation of those disfavored ideas, even along with some sort
of a defense of those disfavored ideas. The basic problem with any
such approach, however, was classically recognized by John Stuart
Mill:
That is not the way to do justice to the arguments . . . . [The public]
must be able to hear them from persons who actually believe them,
who defend them in earnest and do their very utmost for them. [The
public] must know them in their most plausible and persuasive
form.22

Otherwise put, suppression and disadvantaging of ideas impairs, to
one degree or another, the process of optimally changing one’s mind23
and “prevents us from figuring out just what our minds are on some
subject and what the reasons are for not changing them.”24
15. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled on other grounds by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)
(per curiam).
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See generally William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First
Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1995); Frederick Schauer, Free
Speech, the Search for Truth, and the Problem of Collective Knowledge, 70 SMU L.
REV. 231, 232–33 (2017); Steven D. Smith, Skepticism, Tolerance, and Truth in the
Theory of Free Expression, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 657 (1987).
19. See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment, 110 NW.
U. L. REV. 1097, 1119–23 (2016) (recognizing that First Amendment rights, including
speech, protect and foster active citizenship necessary for representative democracy);
Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 482–83
(2011) (recognizing “public discourse” as an important aspect of a citizen’s access to
and participation in democratic self-governance).
20. See generally FLOYD ABRAMS, THE SOUL OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 22
(2017) (emphasizing the value of “individual self-fulfillment”); C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 253, 259, 268–69 (2011); Brian C.
Murchison, Speech and the Self-Realization Value, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443,
502–03 (1998).
21. See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text.
22. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 99 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin
Books 1974) (1859).
23. See Joshua Cohen, Freedom of Expression, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 207, 235
(1993).
24. Id. Given these concerns, “suppression” and “disadvantaging” may either precede the speech—as a prior restraint—or else follow the speech—as some sort of
criminal, civil, or administrative punishment, denial of benefit, arbitrary refusal to
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Generally, official suppression of ideas tends to impair the capacity
for meaningfully critical public reflection that is essential to a broadly
liberal polity.25 More dramatically, it might be held that “the government cannot suppress political ideas that pose challenges to it, because
one aspect of a legitimate government is that criticism of those presently in power may be entertained.”26 Of course, governments might
wish to suppress even some ideas that are not at all critical of the
government in question,27 even if thereby jeopardizing the legitimacy
of the regime.28 But in any event, there is some linkage between a
government’s refraining from idea suppression and the government’s
maintaining its own basic legitimacy.
Scholars of the First Amendment have been similarly unsympathetic to official restriction of the expression of ideas. Alexander
Meiklejohn, for example, declared that “suppression of ideas about
the common good, the First Amendment condemns with its absolute
disapproval.”29 More elaborately, Professor Geoffrey Stone interprets
the First Amendment to generally deny officials the authority “to suppress the advocacy of an idea because the majority believes the idea to
be false or unwise or wrongheaded or dangerous and does not trust
other citizens to make the ‘right’ decisions about such views.”30 Crucially, though, many government restrictions on speech again involve
no objectionable intent.
The costs of speech inhibition imposed by often biased and inevitably fallible31 government officials are thus clear. Recognizing these
costs, though, need not imply any form of free speech absolutism. Alleged government suppression of ideas is commonly tested by, for exmodify the rule, or other adverse response. See Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist.,
713 F.3d 25, 42 (10th Cir. 2013). Thus, actionable suppression or disadvantaging need
not successfully deter or prevent the speech.
25. See Brian Barry, How Not to Defend Liberal Institutions, 20 BRIT. J. POL. SCI.
1, 3 (1990).
26. Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 122
(1989).
27. We can imagine, for example, a government’s attempt to suppress or disadvantage basic criticism of a favored constituency or client-group.
28. Beyond some point, the broad, sustained, and severe suppression of a sensible
critique of a government-favored, major client group would call the regime’s legitimacy into question.
29. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 27 (1948). Zechariah Chafee reviewed Meiklejohn’s book. Zechariah
Chafee, Jr., 62 HARV. L. REV. 891, 894 (1949) (reviewing ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN,
FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 27 (1948)).
30. Geoffrey R. Stone, American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut: “The Government Must Leave to the People the Evaluation of Ideas”, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1219,
1227 (2010). The title reference is to Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in the case of American Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d mem., 475
U.S. 1001 (1986).
31. See MILL, supra note 22, at 77–79.
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ample, the elements of the Brandenburg subversive advocacy case.32
Thus, as Professor Stone summarized the case law,
the government cannot constitutionally punish the expression of
particular ideas or viewpoints unless it can prove, at the very least,
that the speech would cause imminent and grave harm that could
not be prevented by means other than by suppressing free
expression.33
It is thus fair to say, before we begin to ask any of the hard analytical questions, that governmental restriction on free expression is
generally disfavored. How and where this laudable general sentiment should be made operative in free speech cases is pursued
below.

III.

OFFICIAL RESTRICTION OF EXPRESSION & GENUINE
HOSTILITY TO IDEAS & BELIEFS
A. The Idea of Suppression

Governments often seek to restrict private actor speech based on
what is sometimes casually referred to as “dislike”34 of the ideas, opinions, or viewpoints involved. Rarely, however, will mere “dislike,”
whether by the restricting government or by any interest group, exhaust the significant motivations underlying the restriction in question. At best, the notion of “dislike” must be taken as shorthand for
further, underlying concerns. As Professor Stone observes, the idea in
question may more broadly be considered “false or unwise or wrongheaded or dangerous.”35 There are, again, cases in which a government might suppress an idea that it actually approves on the merits,
but which is embarrassing to some third party or otherwise inappropriate. A government might prefer to express the idea on its own initiative. Or a government might suppress even an approved idea in
order to intimidate some group, or to demonstrate its power.
The crucial point, though, is that in a wide variety of what are referred to as content-based restrictions on speech,36 there may be no
32. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
33. Stone, supra note 30, at 1229.
34. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853, 872 (1982) (plurality opinion) (“[L]ocal school boards may not remove
books from school library shelves simply because they dislike the ideas contained in
these books and seek by their removal to ‘prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.’ ” (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (referring to “proscribing speech . . . because of disapproval of
the ideas expressed”).
35. Stone, supra note 30, at 1227. Governments will of course not cite merely their
own hostility to an idea, but also the supposed adverse consequences of that idea.
36. Very roughly, a restriction of speech that is based on the content of the speech
focuses crucially on some small attempt by a speaker to convey some message, and
some attempt by an audience to understand or interpret the message. In contrast,
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evidence of a government’s dislike, fear, distrust, hostility, opposition,
disdain, or animus toward any idea that is sought to be expressed. In
the absence of any such motive, it become unclear at best why rigorous judicial scrutiny as outlined above,37 remains appropriate.38 After
all, there are costs not only of restricting speech,39 but of overextending constitutional protection, and of excessively stringent constitutional protection, as well.40
B. The Mahanoy School Speech Case
Consider, to begin with, some of the Supreme Court’s cases in
which an intent to suppress or significantly disadvantage an idea might
have been either present or absent. Let us focus initially on the recent
public school cheerleader speech case of Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L.41
In Mahanoy, a public school sought to discipline B.L., a student and
cheerleader, for an off-campus Snapchat post to a potential direct audience of 250 friends.42 The post involved a conventionally impolite
gesture43 and a series of terse imprecations.44 The particular objects of
B.L.’s displeasure were, respectively, “school,” “softball,” “cheer,”
and more compendiously, “everything.”45
Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court in Mahanoy referred, bracingly, to the broad background of free speech law and principle. Thus,
many cases of restricting speech because of sheer sound volume or time of day may
not be message-focused. See generally R. George Wright, Content-Neutral and Content-Based Regulations of Speech: A Distinction That Is No Longer Worth the Fuss, 67
FLA. L. REV. 2081, 2087 (2015) [hereinafter No Longer Worth the Fuss]; R. George
Wright, Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech: The Limitations of
a Common Distinction, 60 U. MIA. L. REV. 333, 333 (2006) [hereinafter The Limitations of a Common Distinction].
37. See supra Part II; see also Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 179, 182–83
(2015) (Kagan, J., concurring) (holding content-based strict scrutiny as appropriate
only when there is a “realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot”
(quoting Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 189 (2007)).
38. As the Court has recognized, there are also textually content-neutral restrictions on speech that may indeed reflect hostility to particular ideas on the part of the
drafters, or the administrators, of the speech restriction in question. See Reed, 576
U.S. at 164–67. See generally R. George Wright, Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions
on Speech, 40 N. ILL. L. REV. 265, 265 (2020) [hereinafter Time, Place, and Manner
Restrictions]. The common distinction between an absolute prohibition on speech in
some context and a time, place, or manner restriction on the speech in question is an
arbitrary distraction. Either form of speech restriction may be re-described as the
other. See id. What matters, again, is intent to suppress an idea.
39. See supra Part II.
40. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
41. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2042–43 (2021).
42. See id. at 2043.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id.
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America’s public schools are the nurseries of democracy. Our representative democracy only works if we protect the “marketplace of
ideas.” This free exchange facilitates an informed public opinion,
which, when transmitted to lawmakers, helps produce laws that reflect the people’s will. That protection must include . . . unpopular
ideas . . . . Thus, schools have a strong interest in ensuring that future generations understand the . . . aphorism, “I disapprove of what
you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.”46

Against this inspiring background, Justice Breyer then focused in particular on B.L.’s speech. In Justice Breyer’s interpretation, B.L.’s post
involved community rule-criticism.47 In particular, “[p]utting aside the
vulgar language, the listener would hear criticism, of the team, the
team’s coaches, and the school — in a word or two, criticism of the
rules of a community of which B. L. forms a part.”48 And while “[i]t
might be tempting to dismiss B.L.’s words as unworthy of the robust
. . . protections . . . [,] sometimes it is necessary to protect the superfluous in order to preserve the necessary.”49
On the sharply focused approach recommended herein, the most
important issue in the Mahanoy case would be whether the school
authorities intended to suppress or disadvantage any idea, opinion, or
belief that B.L. sought to express. The Mahanoy case circumstances
are laden with all sorts of intriguing complications.50 But let us focus
sharply on the implications of either the presence or the absence of
any official intent to suppress or disadvantage any idea expressed by
B.L.
If the school’s attempted discipline of B.L., whether mild or severe,
actually reflected an intent to suppress or disadvantage her expressed
ideas, then the value of speech,51 and the disvalues of its inhibition,52
should largely dictate that the attempted speech restriction be judi-

46. Id. at 2046.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 2048 (citing Tyson & Bro.—United Theatre Ticket Offs., Inc. v. Banton,
273 U.S. 418, 447 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). In Banton, Justice Holmes interestingly observes that “to many people the superfluous is the necessary.” Tyson, 273 U.S.
at 447 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer, in turn, may have a sort of First
Amendment overbreadth argument in mind. Cf. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521
(1972).
50. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, A Modest Proposal to Protect Profanity in Public
Schools (Warning: Contains Profanity), DORF ON LAW (June 25, 2021), http://
www.dorfonlaw.org/2021/06/a-modest-proposal-to-protect-profanity.html [https://
perma.cc/AM6M-DUYM]; Justin Driver, Why We All Should Want the Suspended
Cheerleader to Win Her Supreme Court Case (Apr. 30, 2021, 10:24 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/04/30/why-we-all-should-want-suspendedcheerleader-win-her-supreme-court-case/ [https://perma.cc/5AS2-YKNV].
51. See supra Part II.
52. See supra Part II.
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cially nullified.53 An intent to suppress an idea is crucially distinct
from an intent to protect or promote some legitimate interest or purpose of the public schools.54
As used herein, an intention55 to suppress or disadvantage an idea,
or its expression, is a judicially familiar state of mind that is reasonably ascertainable through entirely familiar judicial inquiries. The law
in general recognizes a range of meanings, in diverse contexts, of the
idea of intent.56 The precise meaning of intent in any legal context can
always be contested.57 The technically possible abstract complications
are, inevitably, endless. All of this must be conceded.
For our purposes, though, all that is needed is a familiar, homespun, jury-friendly sense in which an official intent to suppress or disadvantage an idea, or its expression, reflects some sort of desire58 for
that speech-restrictive outcome, along with a sense of agency on the
part of the government actor in giving effect to, or helping to give
effect to, that speech-restrictive desire.
Crucially, not all of the effects of an official action, even if the effects are foreseen and inevitable, will count, by ordinary standards, as
intended. Some important and clearly foreseen effects of policy decisions are unintended, and are perhaps deeply regretted. We might
think of the desire of a conscientious military commander to minimize
unintended civilian casualties, while knowing and regretting that the
number of such civilian casualties is unlikely to turn out to be zero.59
More familiarly, we intend to accelerate an automobile by hitting
the gas pedal. But ordinarily, we do not also thereby intend to hasten
the time at which we must refuel. We intend to enjoy a delicious ice
cream. Typically, though, we do not also intend to draw down our
53. We temporarily set aside the inevitable complications of mixed-motive cases
and the appropriate burdens, tests, and standards of proof associated therewith. See
infra notes 186–214 and accompanying text.
54. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (stating some basic pedagogical and cultural aims of the public schools).
55. We set aside the question of subconscious intentions of natural persons or of
institutions, at least to the extent that such forms of intent cannot be meaningfully
established in a court of law.
56. See generally Robert Audi, Intending, 70 J. PHIL. 387, 387 (1973); David
Crump, What Does Intent Mean?, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1059, 1061–62 (2010); R. A.
Duff, Intentions Legal and Philosophical, 9 OX. J. LEGAL STUD. 76, 76 (1989);
Anthony Kenny, Intention and Purpose, 63 J. PHIL. 642, 650 (1966); Raymond Lyons,
Intention and Foresight in Law, 85 MIND 84, 84 (1976); Mark Thornton, Intention in
Criminal Law, 5 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 177, 177 (1992). Herein, we also set aside any
possible difference between “intent” and “intention.”
57. See sources cited supra note 56.
58. Of course, the desires that a person or institution holds may be equivocal or
ambivalent. See, e.g., Olivier’s HAMLET (Two Cities Films Shakespeare’s Hamlet (Int’l
1948)) (“This is the tragedy of a man who could not make up his mind”).
59. See generally R. George Wright, Noncombatant Immunity: A Case Study in the
Relation Between International Law and Morality, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 335, 336
(1991) [hereinafter Noncombatant Immunity].
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stock of ice cream, or to raise even slightly the chances of any disease
resulting from ice cream consumption. Actors may, of course, misdescribe the scope of their intentions when challenged in a court of
law. But the law has developed familiar techniques to work past such
misdescriptions.60 And the philosophers have refined our broader understanding of the distinction between intended and merely foreseen
effects.61
The school authorities in Mahanoy were judged, as reported by Justice Breyer, to have interpreted B.L.’s communication as criticism of
school personnel or school policies and practices.62 On this assumption, we are left with two plausible views of the school officials’ punitive response. The school officials may, indeed, have intended, at least
in part, to suppress or disadvantage the expression of B.L.’s critical
ideas. To the extent that the officials intended, specifically, to suppress
or disadvantage the relevant ideas, their actions deserve the strictest
and most rigorous judicial scrutiny.
On the other hand, if the intention of the school officials can be
judged to have been independent and distinct from any such idea suppression, and to have proceeded instead from some circumstantially
appropriate and legitimate broadly pedagogical interest,63 their actions, however, objectionable in other respects, should not be held to
violate B.L.’s free speech rights in particular.
Imagine, for example, that the ultimate decision-making authorities
actually agreed with the merits of B.L.’s criticisms. But those authorities also determined, reasonably, under the specific circumstances,
that the imposed discipline would somehow genuinely advance the basic educational, civic, and community goals of the school system. The
authorities, on these assumptions, thus had no desire, in any ordinary
sense, to suppress any idea expressed by B.L. In such a case, the various costs of official inhibition of speech64 would be largely absent, at

60. See infra notes 191–214 and accompanying text.
61. See generally T.A. CAVANAUGH, DOUBLE EFFECT REASONING: DOING GOOD
AND AVOIDING EVIL (Oxford Univ. Press 2006); THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT
(P.A. Woodward ed., 2001); Nancy Davis, The Doctrine of Double Effect: Problems of
Interpretation, 65 PAC. PHIL. Q. 107, 108 (1984); Alison McIntyre, Doctrine of Double
Effect, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect (Dec. 24,
2018) [https://perma.cc/7DZD-B674]; Dana Kay Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless, Three
Cheers for Double Effect, 89 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 125, 125 (2014); Alexander R. Pruss, The Accomplishment of Plans: A New Version of the Principle of
Double Effect, 165 PHIL. STUD. 49, 49 (2013); Suzanne M. Uniacke, The Doctrine of
Double Effect, 48 THOMIST 188, 188 (1984).
62. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (2021).
63. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (stating some basic pedagogical and cultural aims of the public schools).
64. See supra Part II.
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least if the authorities publicly explained their benign motivations and
intent.65
For our purposes, it does not particularly matter which of these two
above scenarios most accurately describes the circumstances in Mahanoy in particular. Perhaps one could make at least a minimally plausible case for either scenario. The point, rather, is that the trier of fact in
all appropriate cases should be required to focus crucially on the available evidence for, and against, any official intent to suppress or disadvantage the idea at issue. After all, the trier of fact, in a broad range of
criminal66 and civil67 cases, is similarly left to determine parallel issues
of intent without extraordinary judicial oversight.68
Often, we can test for the presence of an official intent to suppress
an idea by considering whether the government would likely still regulate the same idea, expressed to the same audience, but in different, at
least equally appropriate, speech channels.69 If, for example, a government prohibits the publication of a book in one format, but permits
the same book to be published as a readily available paperback, or
electronically, or on acid free paper, it seems unlikely that the initial
prohibition was driven, even in part, by a desire to suppress any idea.
But the Mahanoy case is particularly challenging and difficult in this
respect. Suppose we assume that the school authorities would not
have punished B.L.’s criticisms70 had they been couched in equally
vehement, but more decorous, language, in some medium clearly
within the scope of the school’s disciplinary jurisdiction. This is clearly
a reasonable assumption. But given the distinctive character and context of B.L.’s actual speech, we can still not uncontroversially confidently conclude that the actual punishment of B.L.’s actual speech
involved no intent to suppress an idea. The Supreme Court case law
65. Such an explanation, if plausible, would work against any unintended “chilling
effect” or inhibition of the speech of third parties.
66. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.01 (8th ed.
2018).
67. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 55 (1980) (discussing intent to
discriminate in a voting rights case); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
200 (1995) (discussing affirmative action in an employment case).
68. A bit further afield, the courts trust themselves to determine the presence,
absence, and content of congressional intent across a broad range of administrative
and other contexts. See generally Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (showing the methods and complications of ascertaining congressional intent); Chevron v.
Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (showcasing the difficulties of ascertaining congressional intent).
69. See generally R. George Wright, The Unnecessary Complexity of Free Speech
Law and the Central Importance of Alternative Speech Channels, 9 PACE L. REV. 57,
58 (1989) [hereinafter The Unnecessary Complexity of Free Speech Law].
70. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B. L., 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (2021) (“Putting aside
the vulgar language, the listener would hear criticism, of the team, the team’s coaches,
and the school—in a word or two, criticism of the rules of a community of which B. L.
forms a part.”).
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on profane speech, as we shall now see below, will allow no such uncontroversial conclusion.
C. Further Mainstream Case Law on Restriction & Intent in
Mahanoy and Elsewhere
The above uncertainty in the Mahanoy case reflects the Supreme
Court’s lack of clarity as to whether a profane expression should count
as the same idea as an equally vehement, but non-profane, expression
of the same general underlying concern. This lack of judicial clarity
traces to the Court’s near mirror-image discussions in, respectively,
Cohen v. California71 and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.72
The Cohen case overturned a disorderly conduct conviction for the
terse, profane, critique on a jacket of regarding the Vietnam War-era
military draft.73 The Court in Cohen assumed that the profanity in
question, later echoed in Mahanoy, indicated the presence of an emotional, along with a cognitive, meaning.74 More generally, the Court
observed that much language “conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detailed explication,75 but otherwise inexpressible76
emotion as well.”77 Crucially, the Court then went on to declare that it
could not accept “the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of
the cognitive content of individual speech has little or no regard for
[the] emotive function [of the speech].”78
A Court plurality, however, later adopted an approach at remarkable variance from that in Cohen. In a case involving an FM radio
broadcast of satirist George Carlin’s seven “Filthy Words” monologue, the Court concluded that the administrative fine imposed in the
case did not reflect any hostility or disagreement, by the FCC, with
the content, message, or ideas conveyed by George Carlin’s monologue.79 Rather, the FCC’s objection was, distinctively, merely to the
specifically profane mode of expression, in context, of the ideas at
71. See generally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 15–26 (1971).
72. See generally FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744–48 (1978) (plurality
opinion).
73. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16–17.
74. See id. at 26. See generally R. George Wright, An Emotion-Based Approach to
Freedom of Speech, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 429 (2003) [hereinafter An Emotion-Based
Approach].
75. Or, presumably, vague, murky, or confused ideas as well. See, e.g., Hurley v.
Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).
76. Here, the “inexpressibility” by other means presumably refers to the capabilities of the particular speakers in context. There is no obvious reason why emotions
conveyed through profanity of whatever intensity could not more generally be conveyed through art, music, or non-profane language just as faithfully.
77. This refers to “emotional” rather than “emotive” in a technical sense. See generally J. O. URMSON, THE EMOTIVE THEORY OF ETHICS (1968), for a discussion of the
latter.
78. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
79. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746–47 (1978).
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stake.80 The ideas conveyed by the monologue were thus constitutionally protected, but the specific language in the monologue judged to
be “vulgar,”81 “offensive,”82 and “shocking,”83 was not.84
Crucially for our purposes, and contrary to the general principle expressed in Cohen, the Court plurality in Pacifica declared that “a requirement that indecent language be avoided will have its primary
effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication.
There are few, if any thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of
less offensive language.”85
As a result of this unresolved conflict between the respective approaches of Cohen and Pacifica, we cannot be sure whether the profane emotional meaning of B.L.’s speech in Mahanoy means that her
speech conveys an idea that is different, for constitutional purposes,
from otherwise similar criticism that lacks any such distinctively profane expression and emotional meaning.
If, pursuant to the Court’s approach in Cohen, the distinctly profane character of B.L.’s speech means that the speech conveys an idea
distinct from an otherwise similarly fervent, but non-profane, speech,
then matters are indeed complicated. We could not then say that the
school officials in Mahanoy would permit the same idea expressed in
different emotional terms. The non-profane version of B.L.’s speech
would instead convey a constitutionally different idea. And we would
not then be able to conclude that the school officials did not intend to
suppress B.L.’s idea, because a non-profane, permitted expression
would then be of a different idea. The determination of whether those
officials intended to suppress an idea would have to be made on other
grounds.
A number of other recent, close, and intensely controversial Supreme Court cases also implicitly raise interesting questions of
whether the speech regulation at issue involved an attempt to suppress or disadvantage the expression of an idea. The case of Iancu v.
Brunetti, for example, involved an attempt to register a clothing trademark that was denied on statutory grounds.86 The mark in question,
pronounced as four consecutive letters, was F-U-C-T.87 Registration
of the mark was initially denied on the statutory grounds that the
80. See id. at 747–48.
81. Id. at 747.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 746–48.
85. Id. at 743 n.18. If this language was intended to suggest that non-serious ideas
are entitled to lesser or no constitutional protection, that suggestion has not been
uniformly endorsed. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of
Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995); Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038,
2042–43 (2021).
86. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019).
87. Id.
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mark was immoral or scandalous, understood to mean that a substantial element of the public would find the mark shocking, offensive,
vulgar, or disgraceful.88
In our approach, the central question would be whether such denial
of registration would involve any intent to suppress or disadvantage
an idea, or its expression. If the trademark in question fell short of
being, or expressing, any sufficiently recognizable idea,89 the mark
would presumptively not qualify for protection on free speech
grounds. But if some minimally sufficient ideas were indeed present,
one could then easily attribute the denial of trademark registration at
least in part to an intent to suppress or disadvantage that idea. The
basic problem here is that of the continuing murkiness of the judicial
distinction between speech and non-speech. Rather than focusing on
how to draw this distinction, we would recommend bypassing the
question by focusing instead on the government’s clear disapproval of
the presumed message of the assumedly offensive mark. And this is
essentially the bottom-line conclusion eventually arrived at in
Brunetti.90
The criminal indictment of the defendant’s speech in the “Stolen
Valor” case of United States v. Alvarez91 raises other concerns. The
statute in question prohibited, among other speech acts, a lying claim
to have been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.92 It would
be more difficult to claim, as one might in Brunetti, that Alvarez expressed no cognizable idea, for free speech purposes, in claiming to
have been thus recognized. It is unclear whether such a distinctively
personalized claim by Alvarez raises, even implicitly, any broader social issue or concern.93 But if a sufficient idea is present in the case of
Alvarez,94 the most important question should then be whether the
statute, or the indictment, represents even in significant part an intent
to suppress or disadvantage the clear idea95 in question. The statutory
88. See id. at 2298.
89. For guidance on this general question, see infra notes 128–41 and accompanying text; R. George Wright, What Counts as “Speech” in the First Place?: Determining
the Scope of the Free Speech Clause, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1217, 1218 (2010) [herinafteer
What Counts as “Speech”]; MARK V. TUSHNET, ALAN K. CHEN & JOSEPH BLOCHER,
FREE SPEECH BEYOND WORDS: THE SURPRISING REACH OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
1–14 (2017).
90. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2297 (“We hold that this provision . . . disfavors
certain ideas.”).
91. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 713 (2012).
92. Id.
93. See generally R. George Wright, The Constitutional Status of Speech About
Oneself, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 489 (2011) [hereinafter Speech About Oneself].
94. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 712.
95. Presumably, the clear idea is something like the idea that Alvarez received the
Congressional Medal of Honor. One might argue that the dominant legislative intent
was instead to ensure that legitimate claims to have received the medal would be
taken seriously and proper credit would be extended to awardees. Any debate over
ideas would be secondary on this view. See generally R. George Wright, “What Is That
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intent was, instead, presumably one of promoting the legitimate, voluntary recognition of heroic valor, but not one of preventing or punishing any speech that denies or criticizes that goal or intent. If one
instead thinks of the prosecution of Alvarez as an attempt to suppress
some meaningful idea, the appropriate judicial test would then be one
of strict scrutiny.96 In ordinary perjury or fraud prosecutions though,
the government intent is not generally to suppress some particular
idea.
In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association,97 the presumed
ideas in question were less merely personalized in their focus than in
Alvarez. Entertainment Merchants involved a state statutory prohibition of the sale or rental to minors of particular kinds of violent video
games.98 Specifically regulated were games
“in which the range of options available to a player includes killing,
maiming, dismembering, or sexually assaulting an image of a human
being, if those acts are depicted” in a manner that “[. . . [a] reasonable person, considering the game as a whole, would find [it] appeals
to a deviant or morbid interest in minors,” ; [that] is “patently offensive to prevailing standards in the community as to what is suitable
to minors; [and that] causes the game, as a whole, to lack serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.”99

It is possible that the idea sought to be conveyed was that of the artistic, or at least the entertainment, value of the depicted or participatory
mayhem.100 But the defendants could credibly assert that the speech
restriction was intended, at least in part, to suppress or disadvantage
precisely the idea that the games are worthy in that respect.101 Such a
Honor?”: Re-Thinking Free Speech in the “Stolen Valor” Case, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
847 (2013) [hereinafter “What Is That Honor?”].
96. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 179, 182–83 (2015) (Kagan, J., concurring) (holding content-based strict scrutiny as appropriate only when there is a “realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot”).
97. Compare Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 789 (2011), with United
States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 713 (2012).
98. See Brown, 564 U.S. at 789.
99. Id. (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(d)(1)(A) (West 2006)).
100. It is also possible that the sellers of the video games in question had neither
conceived of nor intended to convey any cognizable idea at all. Cf. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007) (recognizing the “speaker” as confessedly not intending
to convey any cognizable message); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 563
(1991) (“Miller wishes to dance nude because she believes she would make more
money doing so.”). Any similar question can be bypassed by asking whether the government regulation was nevertheless intended to be speech-suppressive and whether
any “speech” in a constitutional sense was actually present or not. A governmental
intent to suppress an idea does not logically ensure that an idea in the relevant sense
is actually present.
101. And it is possible that this idea might qualify as a mixture of commercial and
non-commercial speech if not as primarily non-commercial speech. See generally Bd.
of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 481–82 (1989). For a more
extreme case, see the so-called “crush video” case of United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.
460, 464–66 (2010). If the sellers’ idea was instead that video violence is harmless and
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claim would then be explored judicially, as the straight-forward essence of the case.
Finally, consider the “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” student speech case of
Morse v. Frederick.102 In Morse, there is an interesting split between
the arguable absence of any intended idea, and the apparent presence
of an idea that might reasonably have been prompted in the minds of
some audience members.103 The plaintiff student, Frederick, testified,
plausibly, that his displayed “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” banner was “just
nonsense meant to attract television cameras.”104 Conceivably, “No
Bong Hits 4 Jesus,” or “[No] Bong Hits [or whatever else] 4 [Whomever]” might have sufficed, at least equally well, for Frederick’s purposes. The school administrators might have chosen to recognize this
absence of any desire to convey an idea. And, if so, there would in the
Morse case presumably then be no intent to suppress or disadvantage
the assumedly non-existent idea that Frederick wished to convey.
The complication, of course, is that the authorities could instead
reasonably believe that some student viewers of the banner would interpret the banner as vaguely endorsing, or promoting, the use of
then-illegal drugs.105 The problem of determining a line between
speech and non-speech would then arise. But in our approach, the key
issue would instead be whether the discipline imposed in Morse reflected, in significant part, an intention to suppress, or disadvantage,
any idea that was either thought by school officials to be expressed, or
prompted in the minds of some viewers of the banner. If so, then on
our approach, the speech restriction would be generally impermissible. Any official anti-drug message the school cared to impart could
have easily been otherwise conveyed. Presumably, a public school can
generally teach the harmfulness of recreational drugs through curricular and non-curricular means, and even subsidize student expression
of agreement with the school’s perspective. And, of course, punishing
the expression of pro-, or anti-, drug speech in the middle of, say, an
algebra class would not generally reflect an official intent to suppress
the idea in question.
D. Restrictions on Nontraditional Means of Speaking
Further complications arise in the cases involving what we might
call nontraditional means of communication.106 In such cases, there
may be an unclear relationship between the speaker’s use of nontradithe government’s intent was to suppress this idea, the proper government policy
would instead be to promote their view that such violence is harmful through other
means.
102. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 393 (2007).
103. Id. at 401.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 401–02.
106. Roughly, “non-traditional means of communication” refers to means of communication apart from the standard means of books, news photographs, lyrics, docu-
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tional means of communication and the officially claimed absence of
any intent to suppress or disadvantage any relevant idea.
Along these lines, there is the recent Eleventh Circuit’s split decision in Burns v. Town of Palm Beach.107 In this case, Palm Beach’s
architectural review commission prevented Burn’s demolishing his
beachfront mansion and building a new, much larger replacement in a
significantly different architectural style.108 Burns raised a free speech
challenge to the decision, which the agency claimed to have been
based on familiar speech-neutral grounds, including ordinary zoning
considerations such as general neighborhood compatibility and
complementarity.109
Burns argued in particular that his new design would reflect “his
evolved philosophy of simplicity in lifestyle and living with an emphasis on fewer personal possessions.”110 Burns “picked a design of international or midcentury modern architecture because it emphasized
simple lines, minimal decorative elements and open spaces built of
solid, quality materials.”111 As well, the design was intended to convey
“Burns’s message that he was unique and different from his
neighbors.”112
The Eleventh Circuit majority, however, rejected Burns’s free
speech claim on the merits.113 Their distinctively narrow grounds for
doing so emphasized that Burns’s own proposed landscaping and construction plans would actually prevent neighbors and passers-by from
viewing, receiving, or understanding Burns’s message.114 As well, the
court observed that “Burns’s mansion was not expressive because its
predominant purpose, as shown by its location, design, and use, was to
serve as a residence.”115 The court emphasized the narrowness of its
holding by declaring,
[W]e are not deciding whether residential architecture can ever be
expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. We have not
mentaries, magazines and newspapers, television and radio media, the internet and
social media, posters, banners, signs, and all similar such familiar media.
107. Burns v. Town of Palm Beach, 999 F.3d 1317, 1317 (11th Cir. 2021); see also
Jim Saunders, Florida Mansion Design Rejection Doesn’t Violate First Amendment,
Court Says, TAMPA BAY TIMES, https://www.tampabay.com/news/florida-politics/
2021/06/09/florida-mansion-design-rejection-doesnt-violate-first-amendment-courtsays/ (June 9, 2021, 5:06 PM) [https://perma.cc/MP2R-VWT5].
108. See Burns, 999 F.3d at 1322.
109. See id.
110. Id. at 1325.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 1317, 1335.
114. See id. at 1338–39.
115. Id. at 1335 (applying a test adopted in Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York,
435 F.3d 78, 96 (2d Cir. 2006), which considered whether the “dominant” purpose of
the clothing at issue in the case was expressive or communicative). Query whether the
primary purpose of a shirt of a particular color indicating a specific political belief is
to convey an idea or to serve as a shirt.
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decided . . . that Philip Johnson’s Glass House isn’t expressive conduct but tattooing is; we have not decided that Jefferson’s Monticello isn’t protected . . . but nude dancing is; and we have not
decided that the Empire State Building doesn’t meet the . . . test but
elevator music does.116

On our approach, Burns should be a relatively easy case. There is
apparently no evidence in the record that the agency in question had
any improper intention in disapproving Burns’s proposed construction. In particular, there seems to be no evidence that the agency harbored any intention to suppress or disadvantage any idea held by
Burns. Nor is there any evidence that the agency had any even minimal disagreement with Burns’s expressed aesthetic ideas.
Burns’s intended message, after all, involved a broad and perhaps
largely personal preference for lifestyle simplicity, quality, austerity,
and uniqueness.117 There is no indication that the agency, beyond its
professed zoning concerns,118 objected on the merits to any such message. And to the extent that Burns actually wished for a well-targeted,
articulate, and extended expression of any or all of his views, he could
presumably have chosen from among the many more traditional, alternative channels of communication.119 Presumably the government
would not have objected to, merely for example, an extended, articulate, permanently accessible presentation of Burns’s ideas on a popular web site.
There are of course many other non-traditional means of expression
and communication apart from architectural design. Among such previously litigated, non-traditional modes of expression are non-representational art;120 decorated rectangular tiles;121 instrumental
music;122 many instances of spectator sports;123 the act of tattooing
and the display of tattoos;124 the blaring of a car horn, if not of an air
116. Id. at 1336.
117. See id. at 1325.
118. See id. at 1322.
119. See generally The Unnecessary Complexity of Free Speech Law, supra note 69.
120. See Mark Tushnet, Art and the First Amendment, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 169,
219 (2012) (noting that political art, if not art more broadly, is “sometimes the object
of suppression”).
121. People v. Chen Lee, 860 N.Y.S.2d 845, 850–51 (Crim. Ct. 2008).
122. See Alan K. Chen, Instrumental Music and the First Amendment, 66 HASTINGS
L.J. 381, 387 (2015) (noting, in particular, the expressive nature and culture-shaping
influence of instrumental music).
123. See Genevieve Lakier, Sport as Speech, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1109, 1112
(2014) (“[S]pectator sports are in fact dense symbolic performances . . . that communicate messages about, among other things, individual excellence and virtue, political
identity, race, gender, sexuality, and even beauty.”).
124. See, e.g., Buehrle v. City of Key West, 813 F.3d 973, 976 (11th Cir. 2015); Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2010); Coleman v.
City of Mesa, 284 P.3d 863, 869 (Ariz. 2012). In the tattoo cases, the relevant idea
might focus on the decision to have a (visible) tattoo or on the particular “text” or
message of that specific tattoo. E.g., Buehrle, 813 F.3d at 976–77.
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horn;125 nude dancing as a commercial performance;126 and at least
some instances of sheer nonsense.127
In cases in which the presence of “speech” within the scope and
meaning of the First Amendment is unclear, the Court has adopted
general guidelines. In the flag burning protest case of Texas v. Johnson, the Court adopted a general two part test in this respect.128 The
Court thus first asks whether the purported speech in question
manifests an “intent to convey a particularized message,”129 and then,
second, whether “the likelihood was great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it.”130 The Johnson Court found
both elements to be sufficiently present.131 And because the restriction of Johnson’s flag-burning speech was found to be contentbased,132 rather than content-neutral,133 the Court applied strict scrutiny and struck down Johnson’s conviction.134
The Johnson Court’s test for the presence of “speech” in the constitutional sense was then effectively loosened in a case involving a Boston St. Patrick’s Day parade.135 In the Hurley case, the Court declared
that “a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of
constitutional protection.”136 This language is certainly consistent with
the Johnson formulation.137 But the Court in Hurley then disavowed
the “particularized message”138 requirement in Johnson. Requiring
any such clarity in the form of a particularized message would deny
free speech protection to “the unquestionably shielded painting of
125. See, e.g., Porter v. Gore, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1162, 1169–79 (S.D. Cal. 2018).
126. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000); Barnes v. Glen
Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565–66 (1991). But not, evidently, most ordinary social
dancing. See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 21 (1989) (allowing dance halls to
limit dancers to a particular age group).
127. See Joseph Blocher, Nonsense and the Freedom of Speech: What Meaning
Means for the First Amendment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1423, 1441 (2014) (suggesting “nonsense” as on some occasions serving “constitutional values such as the marketplace of
ideas, individual autonomy, and democracy” (emphasis omitted)). The clearest cases
might involve, perhaps, deliberate gibberish as a transgressive or otherwise critical
response to government-mandated rote formalisms.
128. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
129. Id. (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (per curiam)).
130. Id. (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11).
131. Id. at 405–06.
132. Id. at 411–12.
133. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (recognizing an assumed governmental concern for military draft readiness).
134. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 411–12, 420.
135. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995).
136. Id.
137. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404.
138. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411
(1974) (per curium)).
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Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schöenberg, or Jabberwocky verse
of Lewis Carroll.”139
We need take no issue with where the Court has chosen to draw the
line between speech and non-speech for constitutional purposes.140 Instead, our sharpened focus herein would allow the courts to bypass
any inquiry into whether a given act or practice is sufficiently expressive to count as speech or not. The judicial focus should instead be on
why the plaintiff’s alleged speech in question was officially restricted.
If the alleged speech was restricted even in part because of an official
intent to suppress or disadvantage what the government imagined to
be some purported idea, however vaguely or inarticulately expressed,
that restriction should be, at the very least, strongly presumed to be
unconstitutional. But if there is no evidence of any such regulatory
intent, and the government has at least minimally reasonable grounds
for the regulation in question, it should hardly matter whether the
plaintiff’s purported speech in question falls within the boundaries of
speech in the first place.
Focusing on governmental intent would thus allow for bypassing
this vexed and controversial preliminary inquiry. Even more importantly, though, our sharpened focus would dramatically simplify free
speech law, at minimal cost, in a further respect. As it stands, free
speech law crucially distinguishes between government regulation of
speech that is based on the content of that speech, and regulation of
speech that is not based on the speech’s content, and is thus said to be
content-neutral.141 This difficult and nearly omnipresent distinction as
well can, on our sharpened approach, generally be bypassed.
E. Content-Based & Content-Neutral Restriction of Speech
This currently central distinction in free speech law is discussed at
length in the sign regulation case of Reed v. Town of Gilbert.142 The
139. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569. For discussion and application of the relaxed Hurley
test for cognizable “speech,” see, for example, Burns v. Town of Palm Beach, 999 F.3d
1317, 1336–37 (11th Cir. 2021); Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 901 F.3d 1235, 1240 (11th Cir. 2018); Robar v. Vill. of Potsdam Bd. of Trs.,
490 F. Supp. 3d 546, 561–62 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) (emphasizing the Johnson formulation);
Phillips v. City of Cincinnati, 479 F. Supp. 3d 611, 634–36 (S.D. Ohio 2020) (discussing
urban homeless encampments as expressive conduct addressing affordable housing
issues).
140. See generally What Counts as “Speech”, supra note 89. For some possible costs
of overextending what counts as speech in the first place, see Frederick Schauer, The
Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613,
1633–34 (2015); Amanda Shanor, First Amendment Coverage, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 318,
322, 330–31, 333–34 (2018). See generally Mark Tushnet, The Coverage/Protection Distinction in the Law of Freedom of Speech—An Essay on Meta-Doctrine in Constitutional Law, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1073 (2017).
141. See sources cited supra note 36. See generally Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576
U.S. 155, 163–171 (2015) (discussing the nature and role of the distinction between
content-based and content-neutral restrictions of speech).
142. Reed, 576 U.S. at 163–171.
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majority in Reed determined that regulations of speech that require
examination of the communicative content of the speech are contentbased regulations.143 An entirely benign government purpose and intention in adopting and enforcing the speech regulation was thought,
in Reed, to be irrelevant to whether such a regulation is content-based
or not.144 Quite apart from any intention, a regulation that requires
inquiry into the communicative content, message, text, subject, or
meaning of the speech counts as content-based.145 And as a contentbased regulation, even the most patently innocently intended regulation must be subjected to the rigorous judicial test of strict scrutiny.146
Thus, as Reed has it, “a law that is content- based on its face is
subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas
contained in the regulated speech.”147 Improper intent is thus, according to Reed, “not the sine qua non of a violation of the First Amendment.”148 And “an innocuous justification cannot transform a facially
content-based law into one that is content neutral.”149 In particular, “a
speech regulation targeted at specific subject matter is content based
even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints within that subject
matter.”150
It has indeed been judicially held elsewhere that government “has
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content.”151 This and similar formulations do
seem to place government concern for speech messages, ideas, subjects, and content all on a par. But any such approach is, on our view,
misfocused, unnecessary, distracting, and generally misconceived.
The occasional Supreme Court opinion this tends to support the
supposed equivalence of idea or viewpoint suppression and regulation
on the basis of subject matter in general, across context and circum143. See id. at 164–65
144. See id. at 165.
145. See id. at 163–64, 166. But see City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475
U.S. 41, 48–49 (1986) (holding benign regulatory motives may downgrade the required level of judicial scrutiny to a limited degree).
146. Reed, 576 U.S. at 165. Strict judicial scrutiny then requires the showing of a
compelling governmental interest underlying, and the narrow tailoring of, the regulation in question. Id. at 163.
147. Id. at 165 (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429
(1993)). Presumably, the motive or intent involved would have to be benign at the
administration, enforcement, and adoption stages.
148. Id. (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 117 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at
167–68.
149. Id. at 166.
150. Id. at 169 (citing Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980)).
151. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (emphasis added) (quoting Bolger
v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983)); see also People v. Ashley, 162
N.E.3d 200, 210 (Ill. 2020).
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stance. But the Court has also occasionally recognized that the government’s ability to impose content-based burdens on speech “raises
the specter that the government may effectively drive certain ideas or
viewpoints from the marketplace.”152 That is, some content-based restrictions raise the possibility that, pursuant to our focus herein, some
ideas may be intentionally suppressed.
Conversely, though, it remains true that some content-based restrictions on speech may simply not raise “any ‘realistic possibility that
official suppression of ideas is afoot.’”153 This is true of many contentbased regulations as defined by Reed;154 of many narrowly applicable
subject-matter based regulations;155 and even, perhaps, of some broad
prohibitions of any discussion, in any forum, of some designated
subject.156
It is possible to imagine a government’s broadly prohibiting the discussion of an entire subject, without being motivated by a desire to
suppress the discussion of any particular idea. At least at the fringes of
conceivability, perhaps, a government might seek to prohibit expression of all perspectives on some particular public issue primarily for
the sake of preventing mass violence, civil rebellion, or other social
disruption independent of any concern for maintaining regime legitimacy. The government might in such a case be uncertain about, or
indifferent to, all of the various views on the prohibited subject in
question.
A related kind of case would involve a contextually narrow and limited-scope regulation of speech where the desire to suppress a disfavored idea is not that of the regulating government itself, but of some
third party to which the government merely wishes to cater. The regulating government in such a case might itself endorse the idea in question, but wish merely to curry favor with the third party would-be
censor. The most sensible judicial approach in such a case, however,
152. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992) (quoting Simon &
Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 116 (citing the cable operator taxation case of Leathers v.
Medlock, 499 U.S. 439–49 (1991), which discusses the risk that content-based regulations might “distort the market for ideas”).
153. Reed, 576 U.S. at 182 (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting Davenport v. Wash.
Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 189 (2007)); see also R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 390; Bruce &
Tanya & Assocs., Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfax Cnty., 355 F. Supp. 3d 386, 408
(E.D. Va. 2018); State v. Boettger, 450 P.3d 805, 809 (Kan. 2019).
154. See supra notes 144–151 and accompanying text.
155. See Reed, 576 U.S. at 182 (Kagan, J., concurring). Consider, for example, that
subject matter-based regulations of speech in what are referred to as limited purpose
or non-public forums must be merely reasonable and must not target some particular
viewpoint. See, e.g., Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1885–86 (2018);
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806–11 (1985);
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (holding the
subject matter regulation in such a forum must be “reasonable and not an effort to
suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view”).
156. For some suggestive elements of such a case, see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,
319 (1988) (discussing minimum distance of signs from foreign embassies).
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might well impute the third party intent to suppress a crucial idea to
the regulating government itself, at least where the third party’s intentions, and the likely idea-suppressive effects, are known to the regulating government.157
What the Reed Court rightly appreciates is that the facial contentneutrality of a speech regulation should not invariably insulate that
regulation from the most rigorous judicial review.158 A facially content-neutral speech regulation may actually amount to a sophisticated,
indirect attempt to suppress or disadvantage some disfavored idea.159
Ideas can be suppressed through facially content-neutral regulations.160 Merely for example, prohibiting all parading while wearing a
military-style uniform arguably says nothing, in itself, about which
ideas can be expressed while parading. But the underlying regulatory
intent night be to disadvantage either pro-military ideas, or the expression of fascist ideas.161 And facially content-neutral parade permit
standards, if those standards are also sufficiently vague, delayed, indeterminate, or subjective, lend themselves especially to an administrative intent to disadvantage disfavored ideas.162
More crucially, though, Reed’s over-extension of strict scrutiny review to cases involving no meaningful intent, at any stage, to suppress
or disadvantage any idea has already led to dubious lower court outcomes. Consider, for example, the on-site versus off-site billboard regulation case of Reagan National Advertising of Austin, Inc. v. City of
Austin.163 This case involved the city’s denial of the company’s application to digitize commercial and non-commercial signs in off-premises, as well as on-premises, sites.164
The Fifth Circuit first addressed whether allowing the digitization of
on-premises signs, but not of off-premises signs, was a content-based
regulation of off-premises speech.165 The court held that this restriction of off-premises signs was indeed based on the content of the regu157. At a minimum, we can say that the law sometimes imputes criminal or civil
intent to a state party where that state actor clearly had no hostile intent toward the
person who is injured by the official conduct at issue. See, e.g., Estate of Randolph v.
City of Wichita, 459 P.3d 802, 824–25 (2020) (discussing the doctrine of transferred
intent).
158. See Reed, 576 U.S. at 165–69.
159. Id. 165–66.
160. Id.
161. See generally Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1200, 1211–12, 1215 (7th Cir.
1978).
162. See, e.g., Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992) (noting the existence of content-based elements of the permitting process); see also Riley
v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 802 (1988) (“[D]elay compels
the speaker’s silence.”).
163. Reagan Nat’l Advert. of Austin, Inc. v. City of Austin, 972 F.3d 696 (5th Cir.
2020), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 2849 (2021).
164. Id. at 699.
165. Id. at 702.
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lated speech.166 The court cited Reed for the proposition that a
regulation is content-based if it “applies to particular speech because
of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.”167 This vague
definition was said to be equivalent to the formulation that a regulation is content-based where it “target[s] speech based on its communicative content.”168
Crucially, the Reagan National opinion then determined that
whether a sign is on-premises or off-premises is “determined by its
communicative content.”169 And because the communicative content
must be examined to determine whether the sign qualifies as on-premises or off-premises, strict scrutiny of the regulation in question is required by Reed.170 In effect, strict scrutiny is required because one
must read the sign for at least the generally uncontroversial, politically
unvalenced purpose of determining how, if at all, the sign relates to
the property on which it is posted.171
Interpreting Reed, the court in Reagan National declared that the
lack of any detectable animus, disapproval, or desire to in any way
inhibit or disadvantage any idea, at any stage, did not preclude the
application of strict judicial scrutiny.172 Consider first, though, that
Reed’s reference to “targeting” speech based on its “communicative
content”173 is, in itself, ambiguous and grossly overinclusive.
The idea of “targeting” some entity suggests first, and most vividly,
something roughly like “shooting at with intent to destroy,” as in
targeting an enemy soldier or an entire city. Even the image of “target
practice” often involves knocking over, or otherwise physically impacting, some object. But it is, secondary and more metaphorically,
also possible to “target” some object in the looser sense of merely
focusing on, addressing, or including that object within the scope of
any regulatory enterprise. Reed’s reference to “targeting” speech may
unfortunately suggest that “targeting” in only the latter, more benign
sense somehow encompasses “targeting” in the former, more aggressive, less benign sense.
Reed’s focus on targeting “communicative content” is thus ambiguous, over-inclusive, and misleading. When we think of targeting a government’s “communicative content,” the primary and entirely natural
response is to think of something like censorship, the enforcement of
orthodoxy, or the deterrence and punishment of disfavored ideas,
messages, beliefs, attitudes, or views with some distinct content.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Id. (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015)).
Id. (quoting Reed, 576 U.S. at 163).
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id. (citing Reed, 576 U.S. at 165).
Reed, 576 U.S. at 165.
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But in reality, and certainly in Reagan National and similar cases, a
regulation targeting “communicative content” involves no such suppressive considerations. There is no sense that the City of Austin,
whatever it thinks about commercial values, signs, digitization, or
premises and their boundaries, is here pursuing any sort of idea-repressive agenda. Presumably, the inevitable balancing of aesthetic,
traffic safety, and other considerations is instead thought to depend,
to some degree, on whether a sign is on the speaker’s own property, or
instead on some remote location. Whether that sort of land-use judgment is justifiable or not is a subject on which reasonable minds may
disagree, on non-speech-related grounds.
Pursuant to Reagan National, the zoning rules enforcers must indeed examine the content of a digitized sign, specifically in order to
see whether its message refers to whatever takes place on the property
on which it rests.174 Typically, though, the rule’s enforcers will not be
looking at the sign’s message in order to check for compliance with, or
deviation from, any regime orthodoxy. Contrary to Václav Havel’s
classic scenario,175 the regulation enforcer in Reagan National may
read and interpret the green grocer’s sign, or any other affected sign,
merely to determine whether it is misplaced, with no discernable political aim or interest.176 The enforcer in Reagan National thus does not
examine the content of the sign in order to in any sense pass judgment
on the merits of its substantive message.177
The interpretation of Reed adopted in Reagan National has been
shared,178 though not universally so,179 in both related and unrelated
regulatory contexts.180 But for our purposes, a rule that requires an
official to read and understand a sign’s date, for example, merely to
determine whether the sign refers to a past or future event,181 is generally not a regulation that should be subjected to strict scrutiny. In
any typical such case, there may well be no detectable intent to sup174. Reagan Nat’l, 972 F.3d at 701.
175. See Václav Havel, The Power of the Powerless, 32 E. EUR. POL. & SOC’YS &
CULTURES 353, 359–60 (Paul Wilson trans., SAGE Publ’ns 2018) (1979).
176. See Reagan Nat’l, 972 F.3d at 701.
177. See id. Here, we of course set aside all issues of libel, fraud, intellectual property disputes, deceptive advertising, and such as well as the presumably rare cases in
which a zoning regulation enforcer does indeed seek to use the rule in order to punish
or deter expression of any disfavored idea.
178. See generally L.D. Mgmt. Co. v. Gray, 988 F.3d 836 (6th Cir. 2021); Thomas v.
Bright, 937 F.3d 721 (6th Cir. 2019); Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411 (7th
Cir. 2015) (panhandling regulation ordinance).
179. See Act Now to Stop War & End Racism Coal. v. District of Columbia, 846
F.3d 391, 404 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citing a regulatory need to read and interpret a date on
a sign merely in order to determine whether any referred-to event had already taken
place).
180. See generally Note, Free Speech Doctrine after Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 129
HARV. L. REV. 1981 (2016) (discussing the respective opinions in Reed).
181. Act Now to Stop War & End Racism Coal., 846 F.3d at 404.
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press, disadvantage, or to drive from the marketplace any view or
idea.182
On our approach, however, the proper judicial response to essentially benign restrictions on the basis of content, however defined, is
not to merely relax the level of scrutiny from strict to any form of midlevel, but still non-deferential, scrutiny.183 Where there is no indication of any suppressive intent, at any relevant stage, the courts should
focus, in free speech challenge, on the mere legitimacy and minimum
rationality of the regulation and its application.184 And this should
apply to commercial speech cases185 as well as to non-commercial
speech cases.186 There is no role for anything like mid-level scrutiny in
such cases.
IV. REASONABLY INFERRING THE RELEVANT RESTRICTIVE
INTENT
Our sharpened focus on suppressive governmental intent, in any
meaningful part, inevitably raises issues of ascertaining, and suffi182. See Reagan Nat’l, 972 F.3d at 707. Whether the logic of Reed in this respect
would apply to a regulation only of commercial speech, as distinct from broadly political or non-commercial speech, is not yet clearly established. See L.D. Mgmt. Co., 988
F.3d at 841.
183. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980) (free speech challenge in a commercial speech context). Presumably, most regulation of advertisements and other commercial speech involves an intent to prevent
physical, medical, or financial harms to unwitting consumers rather than to suppress
or disadvantage an idea. Such cases are not about official stifling or skewing debate.
For free speech challenges in non-commercial contexts, see Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 784, 791, 798–99 (1989) (amplified concert sound volume);
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 289, 294 (1984) (symbolic
camping in national parks); Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 43, 48–49
(1986) (zoning of adult movie theater locations). But cf. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576
U.S. 155, 183–84 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring) (failing to overrule Renton). A similar
analysis of government intent in cases involving national security, defamation, perjury, obscenity, government employee discipline, and other traditional areas of speech
could be readily performed as well. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 355–56 (1980)
(halting distribution of materials by Air Force); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 348–50 (1974) (weighing a state’s interest in passing an antidefamation law);
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 720–21, 747 (2012) (discussing how perjury
harms legitimate government interests); United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529
U.S. 803, 811–14 (2000) (restricting the viewing of adult TV channels); Lyman v. NYS
OASAS, 928 F. Supp. 2d 509, 524–25 (N.D.N.Y. 2013) (rationalizing a state’s interest
in controlling what its employees say).
184. See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109 (1949) (borrowing such a judicial test formulation from the context of equal protection). Today,
this case would likely be decided on commercial speech grounds. Cf. Cent. Hudson
Gas, 447 U.S. at 566 (demonstrating a similar case decided on commercial speech
grounds); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461–63
(1981); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
185. See Cent. Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 566.
186. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 798–99; Clark, 468 U.S. at 289, 294; Renton, 475
U.S. at 43, 48–49.
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ciently proving, the relevant intent. Questions of intent of course pervade the law. Herein, we can be agnostic as between a standard of
proof of intent by a mere preponderance of the evidence;187 by clear
and convincing evidence;188 or even by a beyond a reasonable doubt
standard, as in criminal cases.189 Clearly, though, the regulating government is in the better position to provide most of the supporting
evidence of its own intent, and should thus generally bear the burden
of production and proof of intent in the relevant cases.190
Neither the regulating government nor the challenging party,
though, need feel intimidated by the metaphysics or the alleged subjectivity of intent.191 The long-established general rule at common law
held, usefully, that one “is presumed to intend the foreseeable consequences of his own actions.”192 More narrowly, it was “a general principle that everyone must be presumed193 to intend the necessary
consequences of his acts.”194 Alternatively, an actor is presumed to
have intended the natural consequences of his deeds.195
Crucially, the presumption that an actor intended the natural and
probable consequences of their acts is most fully appropriate with respect to government actions, policies, and rules in general.196 This presumption appreciates the complication that government actions are
“frequently the product of compromise, of collective decisionmaking,
and of mixed motivation.”197 And this sensible presumption applies
187. See, e.g., Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 96–103 (1981) (applying a congressionally mandated preponderance of the evidence standard in an administrative disciplinary case).
188. See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256, 285–86 (1964) (requiring
proof of actual malice by a clear and convincing evidence standard in a libel case
brought by a public official).
189. See, e.g., Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 59 (1989) (requiring
proof of each element beyond a reasonable doubt for RICO conviction in the case of
an adult bookstore).
190. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445–46, 450 (1992); see also Patterson v.
New York, 432 U.S. 197, 205–06, 211 (1977) (discussing burden of proof placement
issues).
191. See generally G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION (Harvard Univ. Press, 2d ed.
1963) (1957).
192. Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 340 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
193. But this presumption need be neither irrebuttable nor an attempt to shift any
otherwise appropriate burden of proof. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510,
516–17 (1979).
194. Toof v. Martin, 80 U.S. 40, 48 (1871). We may assume that “necessary,” as in
the Necessary and Proper Clause context, refers to something less rigorous than logical or physical necessity. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 324–25 (1819).
195. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
196. See id.
197. Id.; see also City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 138 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Justice Stevens’ concurrence in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 253 (1976)).
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not only to federal legislation,198 but to state-level legislation as
well.199
Thus on the one hand, evidence of intent to suppress or disadvantage an idea, or its expression, need not take the form of anything like
a smoking-gun confession by a government actor. But it is also sensible, in cases of collective decisions by governments, to not impute to
the collectivity some merely idiosyncratic, outlying intention, not necessary for the enactment, and that is held by one or more government
actors.200 To qualify as relevant for our purposes, the intention must
have had some meaningful role, if perhaps as one motive among
others,201 in the enactment or enforcement of the restriction on
speech.
Imagine, then, a restriction on speech, whether content-based or
content-neutral on any definition, that is claimed by a regulated party
to have been intended to suppress or disadvantage202 a particular idea.
Assume also, for purposes of clarity, that the burden on the regulated
party’s speech is substantial.203 If, in such a case, the government asserts its innocent, non-suppressive intentions, a court might naturally
inquire into whether the government has, now that the speech-restrictive impact has been legally challenged, explored the possibility of less
speech-burdensome, alternative policies. Speech-suppressive intent
198. See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 158 (1917) (“Congress
must be presumed to have intended the necessary consequences of its action.”).
199. See, e.g., People v. Figueroa, 894 N.Y.S.2d 724, 739 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (“[A]s a
matter of statutory construction, the Legislature is presumed to intend the natural and
foreseeable results of its enactments.”) (citing Dowling v. Church E. Gates & Co., 170
N.E. 511 (N.Y. 1930)).
200. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting the burden of
showing causal irrelevance would, again, generally be with the enacting government).
201. See id. Some courts reject, in some contexts, a substantial factor test of causation in favor of a more demanding requirement that the illicit intent have been causally decisive. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico,
457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982).
202. Whether or not an improper restriction on speech can ever qualify as merely
de minimis or legally trivial, and therefore not subject to judicial redress, the nature
or gravity of the harm must meet at least some minimal threshold in order to be
legally cognizable, if only for showing standing to sue. But the courts are split on
whether the principle of de minimis non curat lex applies in the area of constitutional
rights. That it does is endorsed in Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2504–05
(2019); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977) (procedural due process liberty
interest); Swick v. City of Chicago, 11 F.3d 85, 87 (7th Cir. 1993); Bart v. Tedford, 677
F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982) (section 1983 freedom of speech case). See also JAMES
MADISON, WRITINGS 787–88 (Jack N. Rakove ed., Libr. of Am. 1999) (1802) (discussion on religion). That de minimis requirements do not apply in constitutional right
contexts is, in contrast, endorsed in Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1297 (2021)
(per curium) (“Applicants are . . . irreparably harmed by the loss of free exercise
rights for even minimal periods of time.”) (internal quotation marks deleted), and
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 567 (2001) (commercial free speech
case).
203. But see supra note 202 for discussion on the division in the authorities on the
status of alleged merely de minimis restrictions on the availability of judicial redress.
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may in some cases crystalize post-enactment, and post-initial enforcement. Has the government considered the legal and practical feasibility of granting exemptions, or of somehow amending the rule, in light
of its professed intentions and purposes? A lack of interest in adopting plainly viable, but less speech-suppressive and equally effective
policies may suggest the presence of an intent to suppress the idea.
Of course, the government might have foreseen, and indeed regretted, the speech-restrictive effects of its regulation without also intending them.204 Perhaps the unintended speech-restrictive effects are
inseparable from the otherwise unobtainable desired consequences of
the rule. But if it is apparent that providing the necessary exemptions,205 or a tailored re-drafting, of the policy would not impair the
government’s cited purposes, and would come at reasonable cost, then
the government’s refusal to pursue such possibilities would normally
impeach its claim to the innocence of its intentions.
Circumstantial evidence of a significant intent to suppress or disadvantage an idea can also be shown by adapting any of the considerations discussed in the classic equal protection case of Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Authority.206 One might
thus infer suppressive intent from the fact that a speech regulation
“bears more heavily” on one viewpoint than another.207 Otherwise
unexplainable systematic patterns of adverse impact on particular
ideas may also suggest an invidious government intent.208 The history
of actions, including prior suppressive policies, by the government in
question may also be relevant.209 The sequence of events leading up to
the speech-restrictive decision may be relevant in showing intent as
well.210 Unexplained departures by the enacting government from its
usual procedures,211 or from its usual substantive priorities,212 may be
probative of suppressive intent as well. Of course, official statements
in any legislative history may also be relevant to inferring an invidious
204. See the double effect doctrine discussion supra note 61 and accompanying
text.
205. See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1881–82 (2021) (discussing
the realistic and required scope of exemptions and accommodations in the free exercise context); see also Mast v. Fillmore Cnty., 141 S. Ct. 2430, 2432 (2021) (Gorsuch,
J., concurring). As well, intentional suppression or disadvantaging of speech may also
raise a separate substantial question of a denial of constitutional equal protection.
206. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68
(1977).
207. Id. at 266.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 267.
210. See id. (citing Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373–76, 387 (1967)). As in, for
example, the contemporaneous rise of an overwhelming populist movement in favor
of repressing the idea in question.
211. See id. As in the case, perhaps, an unusual off-the-record or unrecorded discussion followed by a vote.
212. See id.
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intent as well.213 Nor do these considerations exhaust the ways in
which an intent to suppress or disadvantage the expression of an idea
might be inferred.214 In this context, as in other familiar legal contexts
in which questions of intent may be dispositive, mind-reading is
unnecessary.
V. CONCLUSION
We have addressed herein a broad range of problems. A government’s intent to suppress or disadvantage an idea or its expression can
take many forms. The focus herein has been on central problems of
restrictions of the speech of individuals and groups. But a similar repressive intent may also be manifested in official restrictions on freedom of association215 as a sort of preliminary to, or preparation for,
engaging in speech. This only adds to the significance of our subject.
As we have seen throughout, a focus on government intent is welldirected as a matter of First Amendment theory and practice. This
sharpened focus allows for the full appropriate promotion of all of the
basic free speech values and purposes, in all contexts. And this focus
also recognizes the need for the regulation of speech, for appropriate
reasons, in many cases of, for example, commercial fraud, defamation,
some forms of obscenity, perjury, land use, government employee discipline, breaches of national security, the integrity of the voting booth,
and other contexts.
Thus, the costs of this sharpened focus on invidious government intent, in terms either of free speech values or the promotion of various
legitimate government interests, are minimal. The advantage of the
sharpened focus herein is, on the other hand, a matter of minimizing,
if not entirely avoiding, a series of currently prominent but largely
distracting and misleading free speech tests and categories.
As well, all judges who address free speech matters, who engage in
the maintenance and enhancement of the constitutional legal regime,
and who must account for the interests of all those persons affected by
that regime, would benefit from a sharpened focus on what really matters in free speech law. The law of freedom of speech is, as discussed
above, currently a dense thicket of dichotomies, trichotomies, multistep tests, almost indefinitely malleable levels and sub-levels of judicial scrutiny, and any number of context-specific rules and principles.
Much of this baroque structuring is unnecessary, where it is not otherwise costly and harmful.
213. See id. at 268.
214. See id.
215. See generally Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984); Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Becerra, 919 F.3d 1177, 1182 (9th Cir. 2019) (Ikuta, J., dissenting);
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1147, 1159 (9th Cir. 2010); Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509
F.3d 89, 105 (2d Cir. 2007).
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In particular, courts must currently focus, in some cases, on whether
a party’s activities should count, to begin with, as speech for free
speech purposes. This step can be largely bypassed. Courts must then
often focus on whether the speech at issue is, say, commercial or noncommercial. This inquiry, too, can often be bypassed. Then there will
often be an inquiry into whether the speech restriction is contentbased, content-neutral, viewpoint-based, or focused on the subject
matter of the speech in question. Courts then often fret, needlessly,
over whether to call the speech restriction an absolute prohibition, or
else a regulation of the time, place, or manner of the speech. This vast
area of free speech law is, on our approach, largely just a distraction.
As it turns out, whether there is any meaningful government intent
to suppress or disadvantage an idea, or its expression, cuts across and
outweighs the significance of all of these categories. Such an invidious
intent may, or may not, be found in all of the above, and in other
speech contexts. And it is the presence or absence of that intent that
crucially matters for the promotion of the basic values underlying the
constitutional protection of speech.
In practice, a suppressive government intent can often, though certainly not infallibly, be shown by whatever standard of evidence is appropriate, through one or more familiar forms of circumstantial
evidence. Government intent is already standardly in at issue in various sorts of civil rights, anti-discrimination, and equal protection
cases. Assessing the character of government intent is often central to,
and not typically unmanageable in, all such cases.
A restrictive government speech policy may involve no causally
meaningful wish to suppress or disadvantage any particular idea. The
government may be indifferent to, or even sympathize with, an expression that turns out be libelous or a traffic hazard; or geographically misplaced; or disturbingly loud; or a commercial idea that a seller
wishes to assert; or that is perjurious; or that is approved of but inappropriate to the forum in question; or of a policy idea that was expressed by a now terminated government employee; or of a preferred
idea whose expression would impair electoral or national security. In
such cases, the courts should centrally focus on the absence of significant government intent to suppress or disadvantage the expressed
idea, as distinct from any more legitimate government intent. And in
such cases, the absence of any such intent should mean that any constitutional challenge to the government practice or policy should be
brought on other, non-speech grounds.
In the core political speech cases in particular, a meaningful government intent to suppress or disadvantage an idea, or even a broader
ideology, will more often be present. However, that suppressive government intent might be self-servingly re-described, or mixed with
other intentions. Some causally meaningful intent to suppress an idea,
whatever other motives may also have been present as well, may ap-

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\9-2\TWL205.txt

436

unknown

Seq: 32

TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW

10-MAR-22

14:17

[Vol. 9

pear in the classic litany of the crucial subversive political advocacy
cases historically running from Shaffer,216 to Masses,217 to Schenck,218
to Frohwerk,219 to Debs,220 to Abrams,221 to Gitlow,222 to Whitney,223
to Dennis,224 to Brandenburg.225 Determining government intent in
the core political speech cases is, for practical reasons, especially important. A focus on causally meaningful idea-suppressive intent is the
simplest, most theoretically sound, and most civically educational
grounds for condemning, in appropriate cases, the speech restriction
in question.
216. See generally Shaffer v. United States, 255 F. 886 (9th Cir. 1919).
217. See generally Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev’d,
246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
218. See generally Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
219. See generally Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
220. See generally Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
221. See generally Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
222. See generally Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
223. See generally Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring), overruled on other grounds by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969) (per curiam).
224. See generally Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
225. See generally Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444.

